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Retributivists! The Harm Principle
Is Not for You!*
Patrick Tomlin
Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the
harm principle, since the harm principle ðin some guisesÞ concerns the content
of the criminal law, while retributivism concerns the punishment of those that
break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed
alongside any version of the harm principle. In fact, retributivists should reject
all attempts to see the criminal law only through ðotherÞ person-affecting con-
cepts or “grievance” morality, since they should endorse the criminalization of
conduct that is either purely self-harming or good for somebody and bad for
nobody ði.e., Pareto improvementsÞ.
INTRODUCTION
There are, to ðoverÞsimplify, two main questions within the philosophy
of criminal law: What ðif anythingÞ justifies state punishment? And what
kinds of conduct ðif anyÞ are ðor may be madeÞ punishable—what can or
should we criminalize? Retributivism is a theory of punishment. In jus-
tifying punishment, it focuses our attention not on the future benefits
that punishment may bring but rather on past wrongdoing, in virtue of
which, so it is claimed, punishment is deserved. The harm principle is a
* I began thinking about retributivism and its relationship to harm and harm pre-
vention when I worked on the AHRC-funded Preventive Justice project ðAH/H015655/1Þ
with Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner. I am grateful to Andrew and Lucia, and to Antony
Duff, Keith Hyams, Catriona McKinnon, Victor Tadros, and the editors and referees of Eth-
ics for written comments. The article has benefited from discussion at the University of War-
wick and the University of Reading. I should perhaps note, given the subject matter of the
article, that I am not a retributivist, or at least not a committed one. But I am interested in
the structure and implications of the view, especially for other areas of criminal law theory,
and the present article is written in that spirit.
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popular principle of criminalization.1 As I will show, there are a variety
of ways to understand the harm principle, but each demands that when
we enact a criminal law we focus on harmful conduct, conduct that risks
harm, and/or the prevention of harm. Since retributivism has been re-
vived in recent years, and since debates concerning the moral limits of
the criminal law continue to be conducted through the lens of the Hart-
Devlin debate, and Feinberg’s account, retributivism and the harm prin-
ciple are widely accepted positions, and perhaps the dominant positions,
within punitive and criminalization theory, respectively.2
In this article, I show that these two commonly held positions do
not make good bedfellows: retributivists should not accept any version of
the harm principle. For some versions of the harm principle, this is be-
cause retributivism and the harm principle ðor its groundsÞ are simply log-
ically incompatible. For other versions of the harm principle, this is be-
cause, while the positions are logically compatible, the retributivist can
only endorse the harm principle at the expense of adopting highly im-
plausible positions concerning the content of the criminal law, denying
the criminal law the ability to protect the criminal justice process itself—
a key element of the rule of law. Furthermore, the positions the retribu-
tivist would be required to adopt in order to endorse the harm principle
contradict the importance she places on doing retributive justice and the
central place that retributive justice occupies within her understanding
of the importance and justification of the criminal law. My aim is to show
that retributivism and all versions of the harm principle are unattractive
in combination.
RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE
If I am able show that retributivists should not accept any version of the
harm principle, then this is an important finding: two of the main po-
sitions within criminal law theory should not be endorsed alongside one
another. By and large, criminalization and punishment theories are dis-
cussed in isolation from one another, leading to a latent assumption that
we can pick and choose from among theories in either debate without
that leading to consequences for our stance in the other. At first blush,
1. Or, at least, it is often thought of as such. I will show below that Mill’s harm princi-
ple extends far beyond the content of the criminal law.
2. On the rise of retributivism, see David Dolinko, “Three Mistakes of Retributivism,”
UCLA Law Review 39 ð1991–92Þ: 1623–57 at 1623–24; Michael Davis, “Punishment Theory’s
Golden Half Century: A Survey of Developments from ðaboutÞ 1957 to 2007,” Journal of
Ethics 13 ð2009Þ: 73–100 ðalthough Davis disputes that all the theories that have been called
retributive are best thought of as suchÞ. As the article proceeds, the number of influential
figures in the philosophy of criminal law who have endorsed versions of the harm prin-
ciple, often alongside retributivism, will become apparent.
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this seems correct—retributivism and the harm principle may seem fully
independent, as they are theories, or parts of theories, about different
things: punishment and criminalization. This point is emphasised by Jean
Hampton, who states that “there is no inconsistency between the harm
principle and the principle of retribution . . . because the harm principle
is a theory of the content of legitimate law, and the retributive principle
is a theory of punishment for ðlegitimateÞ law breakers.”3
Where these theories have been discussed alongside one another,
several theorists have assumed their compatibility or have even argued
that they are mutually supporting. Hugo Bedau talks of “two basic retrib-
utive principles: ð1Þ the severity of the punishmentmust be proportional to
the gravity of the offence, and ð2Þ the gravity of the offence must be a
function of fault in the offender and the harm caused to the victim,”4 sug-
gesting that only harmful conduct is to be punished. Similarly, Robert
Nozick claims that deserved punishment is a function of harm ðdone or
intendedÞ and the responsibility of the offender.5 Hampton believes that
the two positions support one another, arguing that both “rights-based”
liberalism and retributivism have a similar basis. “Indeed,” she writes, “it
is surely no accident that the clearest proponent of retribution in philo-
sophical history, namely Kant, is also one of the most ardent supporters
of the liberal conception of the state.” According to Hampton, Kant’s
view is one in which retributive punishment “is properly responsive to ½vi-
olations of $ those individual rights that are also part of the moral foun-
dation for the harm principle. Such a view makes the philosophical foun-
dations of the harm principle and retribution not only consistent, but also
mutually supportive.”6
Yet, as I shall show, they are neither compatible in a package that is
attractive, nor are they mutually supporting. This is not simply a matter
of theoretical importance: some countries—for example, Finland and
Sweden—have a legal culture which explicitly embraces both the harm
3. Jean Hampton, “How You Can Be Both a Liberal and a Retributivist,” Arizona Law
Review 37 ð1995Þ: 105–16, 106. See also Herbert Morris, “Professor Murphy on Liberalism
and Retributivism,” Arizona Law Review 37 ð1995Þ: 95–104.
4. Hugo Adam Bedau, “Classification-Based Sentencing: Some Conceptual and Ethi-
cal Problems,” New England Journal of Criminal and Civil Confinement 10 ð1984Þ: 1–26, 13.
Michael Davis uses this claim as the starting point for his rejection of harm as a central con-
cept for retributivism in his “Harm and Retribution,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 ð1986Þ:
236–66.
5. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia ðNew York: Basic Books, 1974Þ, 60–62. No-
zick was later happy for H in his r %H formula ðwhere r is responsibilityÞ to stand for “the
wrongness or harm, done or intended, of the act” ðPhilosophical Explanations ½Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1981$, 363Þ. The later Nozick leans toward the “wrongness”
formulation ð388–89Þ but does not reject the “harm” formulation and remains committed
to the idea that all punishment-worthy action must have a victim.
6. Hampton, “How You Can Be,” 115.
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principle and retributivism ðin that all criminal punishments must be in
proportion to the harmfulness of the conductÞ.7
Some retributivists have resisted a harm-focused theory of crimi-
nalization. Yet nobody, so far as I know, has argued directly from the
retributivist theory of punishment to the rejection of the harm principle
in the way that I do here. The typical strategy is to show the retributivist
some kinds of conduct which she will, it is hoped, believe warrant pun-
ishment but which cannot be criminalized according to the harm prin-
ciple.8 My argument, in contrast, is based on the harm principle’s incom-
patibility with the value of retributive justice itself.9 My claims are either
claims of logical incompatibility or involve pointing to substantive crim-
inal laws which we endorse, and which the retributivist must defend on
the grounds of protecting the value of retributive justice, but which the
harm principle would disallow. Therefore, my arguments are less easily
brushed off by harm-focused retributivists. While such a retributivist may
simply deny that dwarf tossing,10 the desecration of graves, or the destruc-
tion of species11 represent the kinds of wrongdoing that should attract
the interest of the criminal law, she cannot deny the value of retributive
justice, nor can she deny that that value is properly a concern of the crim-
inal law. Ex hypothesi she has affirmed that value and has accepted that
our states should use the criminal law and the criminal justice system to
pursue that value.
In showing a deep incompatibility between retributivism and the
harm principle, my argument represents a narrower but deeper contri-
bution to the assessment of the harm principle than some recent critiques
of it. It is narrower because it shows an incompatibility with a specific
group of theories of punishment, which, while popular, are controver-
7. Essentially, the Swedish and Finnish sentencing regulations are legal instantiations
of Nozick’s formula ðsee n. 5 aboveÞ. Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions ðOxford:
Clarendon, 1993Þ, 90–91. I am grateful to Magnus Ulvang for discussion here.
8. See, e.g., Davis, “Harm and Retribution”; R. A. Duff, “Towards a Modest Legal Mor-
alism,” Criminal Law and Philosophy ðforthcomingÞ; Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame ðOxford:
Clarendon, 1997Þ, chap. 16.
9. Jeffrie Murphy offers a different argument for the incompatibility of retributive
justice and the harm principle, claiming that the retributivist’s commitment to punishing
more for certain mental states experienced during harmful conduct reveals her to not only
be concerned with harm, thus revealing a deep incompatibility between retributivism and
the harm principle. I don’t have the space to discuss Murphy’s views in detail here, but I
find them unpersuasive for reasons articulated, in particular, by Herbert Morris. See Jeffrie
G. Murphy, “Legal Moralism and Liberalism,” Arizona Law Review 37 ð1995Þ: 37–93, and
“Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 ð2007Þ: 5–20;
Morris, “Professor Murphy on Liberalism and Retributivism.”
10. Duff, “Towards a Modest Legal Moralism.”
11. Moore, Placing Blame, 646.
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sial, and therefore I am only able to show that the harm principle should
be rejected if one is a retributivist. It is left open whether we ought to
reject retributivism or the harm principle—but one or the other must be
rejected. The argument is deeper, however, because if we wish to be, or
remain, retributivists, then the argument presented will lead us much
further afield from the harm principle than those who reject the harm
principle often point us. I do not try to showmerely that a retributive crim-
inal law should expand its scope to include conduct that negatively affects
other people in nonharmful ways, and therefore the argument does not
point the staunch retributivist toward an additional or alternative person-
affecting concept with which to limit criminalization—something ðlike of-
fense or sovereigntyÞ that is like harm but not harm.12 Rather, retributivists,
I claim, should reject all views of the criminal law that try to see it purely
through the lens of “ðotherÞ person-affecting ðpoliticalÞ morality.”
RETRIBUTIVISM
Since I want to argue that the harm principle is incompatible with the
value of retributive justice, I should say something about what this value
is and how I understand it. Retributivism is a theory of punishment: it
seeks to justify the normally impermissible treatment of individuals that
comprise state punishment. There are many different types of retribu-
tivism,13 but in justifying punishment all give a starring role to the concept
of desert. According to R. A. Duff there is a “core retributivist thought:
that what gives criminal punishment its meaning and the core of its nor-
mative justification is its relationship, not to any contingent future ben-
efits that it might bring, but to the past crime for which it is imposed.”14
Elsewhere Duff writes that retributivism “justifies punishment in terms
not of its contingently beneficial effects but of its intrinsic justice as a re-
sponse to crime; the justificatory relationship holds between present pun-
ishment and past crime, not between present punishment and future ef-
fects.”15To begin our discussion, any theory can be considered retributivist
if it endorses this principle:
12. For critiques which take this tack, see Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others ðNew York:
Oxford University Press, 1985Þ; Arthur Ripstein, “Beyond the Harm Principle,” Philosophy
and Public Affairs 34 ð2006Þ: 215–45; Victor Tadros, “Harm, Sovereignty, and Prohibition,”
Legal Theory 17 ð2011Þ: 35–65.
13. John Cottingham, “Varieties of Retribution,” Philosophical Quarterly 29 ð1979Þ: 238–
46; Nigel Walker, “Even More Varieties of Retribution,” Philosophy 74 ð1999Þ: 595–605.
14. R. A. Duff, “Retrieving Retributivism,” in Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy,
ed. Mark D. White ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2011Þ, 3–24, at 3.
15. R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community ðOxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000Þ, 19–20.
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The Retributive Principle: the state is ðat least sometimesÞ justified
in imposing punishment on past wrongdoers, even when punishing
them will not prevent harm.
This may be both under- and overinclusive in terms of philosophers’ self-
descriptions as “retributivist.”16 For now, let us focus on the kind of “pure”
retributivism as described by Duff ðwhere preventive concerns play no
role in the justification of punishmentÞ and articulated by the Retribu-
tive Principle ðwhich is a little less restrictive, as harm prevention is sim-
ply not a necessary condition of punishment, such that justified punish-
ment which does not prevent harm is a conceptual possibilityÞ.17 I will
later show how anybody who endorses comparative proportionality in
punishment should reject the harm principle, bringing more ðperhaps
allÞ self-identified retributivists within the scope of the article.
In deciding whether to punish the most serious crimes ðe.g., mur-
derÞ, retributivists as described by the Retributive Principle will not
need to know whether punishing the offender will prevent or deter fu-
ture crimes—the importance of retributive justice ðgiving the offender
the punishment he deservesÞ is, at least sometimes, enough to make pun-
ishment all-things-considered warranted, even in the absence of harm
prevention. This will include the simple “because they deserve it” retrib-
utivism exemplified by Michael Moore18 and retributivists who appeal to
“fair play” considerations in justifying punishment.19
The Retributive Principle straddles both what I will call “telic” and
“deontic” retributivism.20 The telic retributivist’s foundational belief is
that when we punish people because they deserve it, we make things ðin
one wayÞ better—retribution is good. The deontic retributivist’s founda-
16. For example, it could include moral education theories, communication theories,
and threat-based theories, provided that moral education, communication, or the realiza-
tion of the threat are ðat least sometimesÞ recommended even when doing so will not pre-
vent harm. It excludes “retributivists” who see harm prevention as a necessary condition of
punishment.
17. It is worth noting that the Retributive Principle differs from ðand is more de-
manding thanÞ the Retributivist Belief, around which I base my “Time and Retribution,”
Law and Philosophy ðforthcomingÞ, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10982
-013-9196-z.
18. Moore writes that “punishing the guilty achieves something good—namely, jus-
tice—and . . . reference to any other good consequences is simply beside the point” ðPlac-
ing Blame, 111Þ.
19. See, e.g., John Finnis, “The Restoration of Retribution,” Analysis 32 ð1972Þ: 131–35;
Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” Monist 52 ð1968Þ: 475–501; Jeffrie Murphy,
“Marxism and Retribution,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 ð1972Þ: 217–43; Richard Dagger,
“Playing Fair with Punishment,” Ethics 103 ð1993Þ: 473–88; Davis, “Harm and Retribution.”
20. Mitchell N. Berman, “Two Kinds of Retributivism,” in Philosophical Foundations of
the Criminal Law, ed. R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green ðNew York: Oxford University Press,
2011Þ.
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tional claim is that we ought to punish those who deserve it, and this
claim need not rest on a claim about value.
The Retributive Principle also captures “moral” and “legal” retribu-
tivists alike.21 Moral retributivists believe that the wrongdoing described
in the Retributive Principle is moral wrongdoing and that at least some
moral wrongdoing is pre-institutionally defined. Legal retributivists be-
lieve that the wrongdoing in question is doing something that is crimi-
nally prohibited. Some legal retributivists may straightforwardly reject
the harm principle. Since they believe that legally defined wrongdoing
warrants punishment, if they also believe that the legislature has a free
hand over what it makes criminal ðand thus justly punishableÞ, then the
legal retributivist has already rejected the harm principle ðand indeed
any substantive principleÞ as a principle of criminalization. However, the
legal retributivist may believe that while just punishment is connected to
de facto criminalization, there are nevertheless moral limits on de jure
criminalization. This kind of legal retributivist may be tempted to accept
the harm principle as one such limit. I will show why she would be wrong
to do so.
HARM PRINCIPLES
The harm principle is often presented as a theory ðor, at least, one nec-
essary conditionÞ of criminalization: it explains what the criminal law
should proscribe ðor, at least, what it should notÞ. It is a position closely
identified with liberalism. According to A. P. Simester and Andreas von
Hirsch, it is “a familiar tenet of liberalism that the state is justified in in-
tervening coercively to regulate conduct only when that conduct causes
or risks harm to others,”22 while Herbert Morris insists that “A liberal be-
lieves that the only legitimate function of criminal law is to prevent pri-
vate and public harms. This captures liberalism’s attachment to the so-
called ‘Harm Principle.’”23 Jean Hampton approvingly describes Joel
Feinberg’s position as being one in which “what makes a state ‘liberal’
is . . . its rejection of the idea that any enforcement of moral behaviour
should include punishment of immoral behaviour which nonetheless
has no victim other than the offender himself.”24
To put one issue to one side: I do not conceive of the debate con-
cerning the harm principle and the criminal law as a debate about
whether or not the criminal law should enforce morality, even though it
21. I am grateful to an Ethics referee for encouraging me to make this distinction.
22. A. P. Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs ðOxford: Hart,
2011Þ, 35.
23. Morris, “Professor Murphy on Liberalism and Retributivism,” 95.
24. Hampton, “How You Can Be,” 114–15.
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is sometimes understood in those terms. It is better conceived of as a
debate about what subset of morally wrong conduct we can or should
criminalize.25
In this section, I will introduce four different versions of the harm
principle. Each tells us, when criminalizing conduct, to focus on harm,26
but the instructions of each version of the harm principle differ impor-
tantly thereafter. People often talk about the harm principle as if the
principle restricts criminal law to harmful ðor potentially harmfulÞ con-
duct, but not all harm principles ðincluding the famous Millian variantÞ
actually say this. Here I want to show how some related, but importantly
different, positions are often run together under the banner of “the
harm principle.” I will then show, in the sections that follow, that none
of these harm principles should be endorsed by retributivists.
When people invoke “the harm principle” they ðexplicitly or implic-
itlyÞ invoke J. S. Mill. In On LibertyMill famously declares that:
Mill’s Harm Principle ðHP1Þ: “the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”27
There are two important factors to note about Mill’s Harm Principle
from a criminalization perspective, which make it importantly different
from a principle which restricts criminal law to harmful behavior. The
first is that it is not offered as a principle only, or even primarily, for the
criminal law. It is offered as a necessary condition of, and the only le-
gitimate purpose of, any exercise of coercive power, which includes all
state action and many types of nonstate action as well.28 The second
thing to note is that it focuses not on harmful ðor harm-riskingÞ conduct
25. See Joel Feinberg,Harmless Wrongdoing ðNew York: Oxford University Press, 1988Þ,
155; Hampton, “How You Can Be,” 106; Gerald Dworkin, “Devlin Was Right: Law and the
Enforcement ofMorality,”William andMary Law Review 40 ð1999Þ: 927–46; RonaldDworkin,
“Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals,” in Taking Rights Seriously ðCambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1977Þ, 240–58.
26. Here is an important question about ðall versions ofÞ the harm principle: in de-
ciding whether criminalization is justified, does it matter ðand, if so, howÞ why the conduct
is harmful? Conduct can be harmful because our states have made it harmful. Neither of
the obvious principles—that conduct must simply currently be harmful ðregardless of whyÞ
or that conduct must be necessarily harmful ðand not made harmful by the stateÞ—seem
attractive.
27. J. S. Mill, “On Liberty,” in On Liberty in Focus, ed. John Gray and G. W. Smith
ðLondon: Routledge, 1991Þ, 30.
28. In Mill’s liberalism, we are to use the harm principle to decide when to intervene
using either legal penalties “or the moral coercion of public opinion” ð“On Liberty,” 30.Þ.
However, with regard to nonharmful or self-harming behavior, we are permitted to remon-
strate, reason, persuade and entreat ð30–31Þ.
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but rather the prevention of harm. A third important element of Mill’s
Harm Principle is that it says that harm prevention is the only purpose
for which we may coercively intervene in one another’s lives. Therefore
it is a version of what Nils Holtug calls “the justification-based version of
the Harm Principle.”29 That is, harm ðor harm preventionÞ is seen as cen-
tral to the purpose of interference, not merely a condition on it.
Mill’s Harm Principle differs importantly from how many contem-
porary commentators in criminal law theory discuss the harm principle.
First, most assume it is a principle concerning criminalization.30 Second,
most commentators appear to assume that it limits the criminal law to
conduct that is either harmful or risks harm to others. As Duff describes
the basic message of the harm principle as understood in the philosophy
of criminal law, “only conduct that wrongfully harms or threatens to harm
others is a suitable candidate for criminalisation.”31
Duff’s harm principle contains two elements—in order to be brought
within the criminal law conduct must be both wrongful and harmful ðor
threaten harmÞ. There are two different ways that we may combine these
two elements, wrongfulness and harmfulness, within a theory of the moral
limits of the criminal law. In the first, the wrong and the harm must be
interlinked. This will give a harm principle like this one:
Harmful Wrongs Principle ðHP2Þ: the state may criminalize only
harmful wrongs—conduct that is both wrong and harmful ðor risks
harmÞ to others and is wrong because it is harmful ðor risks harmÞ
to others.
Again, this is a “justification-based” version of the harm principle, as harm
is not merely a constraint on what we may criminalize but also plays a cen-
tral role in explaining why we may criminalize the behavior—the crim-
29. Nils Holtug, “The Harm Principle,” Ethical Theory andMoral Practice 5 ð2002Þ: 357–89,
362. Victor Tadros believes that this is the natural way to interpret the harm principle, ar-
guing that “it is in the spirit of the harm principle to see harm not only as a constraint but
also as the primary reason that must be offered by states in favor of criminalizing some
conduct” ð“Harm, Sovereignty, and Prohibition,” 42Þ.
30. See, e.g., Feinberg’s version of the harm principle in Harm to Others ðNew York:
Oxford University Press, 1984Þ, 26. As well as restricting the harm principle to criminali-
zation, Feinberg’s principle also downgrades harm prevention from being “the only pur-
pose,” past “a necessary condition,” to beingmerely “a reason in support” of criminalization.
Since Feinberg separates out harm and offense, I think that retributivists should reject
Feinberg’s ð“bold liberalism”Þ position too, since there are some actions which the retrib-
utivist ought to regard as punishable or criminalizable which do not offend or harm others.
But see Harmless Wrongdoing, 323–24, where Feinberg admits that perhaps some ðunspeci-
fiedÞ harmless wrongdoing may be criminalized.
31. R. A. Duff, “Theories of Criminal Law,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ð2013Þ,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/.
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inal law, on this view, must focus purely on wrongful action that is related
to harm. Hampton and Feinberg argue that the liberal state does not pun-
ish victimless immoral behavior, which may suggest that the liberal state
should only punish behavior that is immoral in virtue of its having a vic-
tim ðand, furthermore, a victim who is harmedÞ. This is further suggested
by Feinberg’s claim that liberals see the criminal law as grounded in a
“grievance morality.”32 This suggests that not only is the conduct that it
is appropriate for the criminal law to prohibit restricted to the harm re-
lated, it is its connection to harm that justifies our making it criminal.
Others, however, reject this understanding of the harm principle,
and this gives rise to the second way of combining wrongfulness and
harmfulness within a theory of criminalization. Simester and von Hirsch,
for example, claim that both harmfulness and wrongfulness are neces-
sary conditions of criminalization but that the two need not go together.
Wrongs that are wrong independently of harmfulness ðharmless wrongsÞ
can be criminalized insofar as the conduct is also harmful or risks harm.
Thus Simester and von Hirsch, firm advocates of the harm principle,
state that “It is implicit in our analysis that some actions are wrongs
prior to, and not in virtue of, any harm . . . that they may cause. Indeed,
there is a range of important offences where the wrong is not, in the
first instance, grounded in any consequential harm.”33 Under such a
view of the harm principle, it is harder to see what justifies the harm prin-
ciple. The Feinbergian argument from a “grievance morality” seems to
justify the harm principle as fundamentally connected to the purpose
and justification of the criminal law. Under a harm principle according
to which harmless wrongs may be criminalized and punished, but only
when they are harmful, it is hard to see, especially from a retributivist
perspective, why we would restrict the criminal law to harmful or harm-
risking conduct only. If the wrong is a candidate for punishment inde-
pendently of its harmfulness, why should harmfulness be a necessary con-
dition for criminalization and punishment? I will return to these issues
below. For now, we can capture this kind of position with this version of
the harm principle:
Necessary Condition Harm Principle ðHP3Þ: it is a necessary con-
dition of criminalizing conduct that the conduct is harmful ðor risks
harm34Þ to others.
32. Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing, 155. See also Hampton, “How You Can Be,” 106.
33. Simester and von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, 51.
34. The advocate of HP3 will owe us an account of what it is to “risk harm” for the
purposes of the harm principle ðDuff, “Theories of Criminal Law”Þ. At the very least, such
an account should rule out “risking harm” as being everything other than conduct that
we are certain cannot possibly lead to harm, since the harm principle would then encom-
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Whether we accept the Harmful Wrongs or Necessary Condition version
of the harm principle, both principles coalesce around what they leave
out, the conduct that they demand must not be criminalized: conduct
that is nonharmful ðand does not risk harmÞ to others. I will show below
that there is some behavior which the retributivist ought to ðand, I con-
jecture, willÞ agree is properly criminalizable, even though it is either
harmless or purely self-harming.
John Gardner and Stephen Shute, however, argue that conduct
need not be harmful or risk harm in order to be criminalized under the
harm principle.35 Gardner and Shute make two key moves in specifying
their version of the harm principle. The first, which we have already
seen, is that they decouple the wrong that justifies punishment from
the criterion of harm. Thus, as Gardner says of a would-be harmless
wrongdoer ðin this case a “harmless rapist”36Þ, “This already picks him
out as a suitable person to be threatened with punishment ðcoercedÞ. It
is not the job of the harm principle to pick him out again.”37 Gardner
and Shute make a second move, developing the harm principle still
further away from the intuitive core of harmful wrongs. Not only can
harmfulness and wrongness be distinct grounds, they also shift the unit
of evaluation for the harm principle ði.e., what it is that needs to be
evaluated in terms of its harmfulnessÞ from conduct to legislation. Thus,
they make a distinction that Mill himself apparently failed to see. In On
Liberty Mill argued, as we have seen, that harm prevention must be the
aim of interference. This led Mill to think that harmful or harm-risking
conduct would be the focus of interference, such that harmless conduct
would be left alone: “the principle of liberty requires liberty of tastes
and pursuits . . . without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long
as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our
conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.”38 Clearly Mill thought harmless
conduct ðeven if wrongfulÞ to be outside the scope of legitimate coer-
cion.
35. John Gardner and Stephen Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape,” in a collection of
Gardner’s essays, Offences and Defences ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2007Þ, 1–32. I am
grateful to James Edwards, Victor Tadros, and Malcolm Thorburn for discussion of this
version of the harm principle.
36. The scare quotes reflect my discomfort with the idea that rape can ever be harm-
less, and the underlying assumption that harm, by definition, must be consciously expe-
rienced. For doubts along these lines, see Tadros, “Harm, Sovereignty and Prohibition,”
47–48.
37. Gardner, Offences and Defences, 243.
38. Mill, “On Liberty,” 33.
pass possibly all human action, including stepping out of one’s front door, switching on the
lights, and so on. See Feinberg,Harm to Others, 190–93, 216–17. ðForHP2, the internal wrong-
fulness constraint will take care of the level of risk required.Þ
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In Gardner and Shute’s variant of the harm principle, however,
harmless conduct can be within the legitimate purview of the criminal law.
This is because we do not need to ask whether the conduct is harmful but
rather whether criminalizing the conduct will prevent harm: “It is no ob-
jection under the harm principle that a harmless action was criminalized,
nor even that an action with no tendency to cause harm was criminalized.
It is enough to meet the demands of the harm principle that, if the action
were not criminalized, that would be harmful.”39 This will give us a harm
principle like this:
The Legislation Harm Principle ðHP4Þ: it is a necessary condition of
criminalizing conduct that criminalizing the conduct will prevent
harm.
I will now show that those who endorse the Retributive Principle ought
to reject all four versions of the harm principle.
RETRIBUTIVISM AND MILL’S HARM PRINCIPLE ðHP1Þ
It is particularly easy to show that retributivists should reject the original,
Millian version of the harm principle.40 The Retributive Principle coun-
tenances punishment evenwhen it will not prevent harm. Consider amur-
derer, who we know is no longer a danger and whose punishment will
not preventharm toothers. According to theRetributive Principle,we can
still justly punish him, since he deserves it. This requires interfering with
him—punishment is a kind of state interference. Mill’s Harm Principle,
meanwhile, explicitly rules out state ðand indeed nonstateÞ interference
unless doing so prevents harm. Indeed, even if the punishment of the
murderer were to prevent some harm, for Mill this is the only reason for
which punishment could be pursued, and so considerations of des-
ert could not play a role in justifying interfering with the individual.
HP1 and the Retributive Principle, therefore, are squarely at odds, both
over whether we can interfere when this will not prevent harm, and over
whether harm prevention is the only legitimate purpose of intervention.
RETRIBUTIVISM, THE HARMFUL WRONGS PRINCIPLE ðHP2Þ,
AND THE NECESSARY CONDITION HARM PRINCIPLE ðHP3Þ
It is not so straightforward, however, for me to show that retributivists
should reject theHarmful Wrongs or the Necessary Condition versions of
39. Gardner and Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape,” 29, and see further 29–32.
40. The tension between backward-looking theories of punishment and forward-
looking liberal concerns is explored in Thaddeus Metz, “How to Reconcile Liberal Politics
with Retributive Punishment,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 ð2007Þ: 683–705.
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the harm principle. This is because, unlike HP1, they are logically com-
patible with the Retributive Principle. Endorsing the conjunction of the
Retributive Principle and the Harmful Wrongs Principle simply requires
the retributivist to endorse one of the following positions:
ðP1Þ Only conduct which deserves ðor will deserve41Þ punishment
may be criminalized, and only Harmful Wrongs ði.e., conduct
that is wrongful because it is harmful or risks harmÞ deserve
punishment.
ðP2Þ Only conduct which deserves ðor will deserveÞ punishment
may be criminalized, only wrongful conduct deserves pun-
ishment, and Harmful Wrongs exhaust wrongfulness.
ðP3Þ Only Harmful Wrongs may be criminalized, and only crim-
inalized conduct deserves punishment.
ðP1Þ and ðP2Þ might be endorsed by the moral retributivist, while the le-
gal retributivist might endorse ðP3Þ. In order to get the retributivist to
reject ðP1Þ–ðP3Þ, we need to show her a class of conduct that is wrongful
and criminalizable, but that is not wrongful in virtue of its harmfulness.
Endorsing the conjunction of the Retributive Principle and the Nec-
essary Condition Harm Principle requires the retributivist to endorse
one of the following:
ðP4Þ Only conduct which deserves ðor will deserveÞ punishment
may be criminalized, and only harmful ðor harm-riskingÞ be-
havior can deserve punishment.
ðP5Þ Only conduct which both deserves ðor will deserveÞ punish-
ment and is harmful ðor risks harmÞ may be criminalized.42
ðP6Þ Only harmful or harm-risking behavior may be criminalized,
and only criminalized conduct deserves punishment.
In order to get the retributivist to reject ðP4Þ–ðP6Þ wemust show her a class
of conduct which she believes deserves punishment, or ought to be crim-
inalized, even though it is harmless or only self-harming.
Consider, now, the body of law which I will call “self-protecting crim-
inal law.” This body of law uses the criminal law to protect, and respond to
violations of, the criminal justice process itself. Examples of such laws in-
clude those that criminalize bribing witnesses, escaping mandated pun-
41. This parenthetical clause allows for conduct that is not morally deserving of pun-
ishment in the absence of a criminal law prohibiting it but becomes so deserving once
criminalized ðe.g., driving on the “wrong” side of the roadÞ.
42. This is the position taken in Douglas Husak,Overcriminalization ðNew York: Oxford
University Press, 2008Þ, chap. 2. Although Husak would most likely reject the Retributive
Principle ðchaps. 3–4Þ, he accepts comparative proportionality and so will be brought
within the ambit of the thesis below.
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ishment, assisting someone to escape mandated punishment and perjury
in the criminal trial. The rationale for all of these laws seems to be the
protection of the criminal justice process—of ensuring just conviction
and punishment. Some conduct proscribed by self-protecting criminal
law is not directly harmful: no one is necessarily directly harmed if I ac-
cept a bribe and then fabricate testimony which helps a criminal escape
punishment.
To help fix ideas, consider the murderer, whose punishment is justi-
fied even if it won’t prevent harm. So far, this is consistent with both HP2
and HP3, since in murdering someone, they harmed someone and mur-
der is wrongful because it is harmful.43 Now, imagine that after he is con-
victed the guards who must transport him to prison pull over to the side
of the road, and open the back doors of the van. Off the murderer runs,
into the night, never to be seen again. Should such conduct be criminal-
ized and punished? Surely. But the retributivist who accepts this should
deny ðP1Þ–ðP6Þ and thus should reject HP2 and HP3. First, consider HP2.
In order to support HP2, the retributivist needs to endorse one of ðP1Þ–
ðP3Þ, which each state that only wrongs that are wrong in virtue of their
harmfulness ðor the risk of harmÞ may be criminalized and punished. Is
letting the murder go wrong because it is harmful? No. For a start, it may
not even be harmful ða point to which I will return belowÞ, but even if
it were harmful, it surely is not wrong in virtue of its harmfulness. The
reason the drivers must not let the man out of the van is because if they
do so, he will escape his just punishment—they interfere with the criminal
justice process. Letting anyone out of the van may risk harm, but the dis-
tinctive wrongfulness of letting this particular person out is to be found
in helping them escape their just punishment.44 Now, if the murderer’s
punishment were justified by the prevention of future harm ðthrough in-
capacitation, special deterrence or general deterrenceÞ then the drivers
would be undermining a harm-preventing institution, and the wrong
would be one of interfering with a harm-preventing institution. In such
a case, then the advocate of HP2 could legitimately claim that the wrong
43. It is, of course, philosophically controversial whether death, and therefore mur-
der, is harmful ðSteven Luper, “Death,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ½2009$, http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/death/Þ. I set these complications aside, since, in political and
legal philosophy, I have never seen anyone claim that murder is outside the parameters of
the harm principle. Whatever people mean to capture by the harm principle, they mean for
it to include murder.
44. An editor of Ethics suggests that in breaking their contracts, the van drivers harm
their employer. But it is far from clear that merely breaking a contract is necessarily harm-
ful—promise breaking needn’t be harmful, and we normally keep employment contracts
outside the criminal law. For those convinced by the editor’s claim, however, we can simply
change the example, such that the prisoner is released by people who haven’t signed any
contract promising not to do otherwise.
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is harmful wrong—that is, interfering with a harm-preventing institution
is wrongful because it is ðindirectlyÞ harmful.
However, the retributivist cannot legitimately claim that the wrong
here is of that sort. That is because the retributivist sees the criminal jus-
tice process as being about giving people their just deserts, or reinstitut-
ing a fair division of benefits and burdens between the law-abiding and
the criminal—in other words, she sees the criminal justice process ðat
least in this caseÞ as serving the value of retributive justice. Since the mur-
derer was to be punished whether this prevented harm or not, then she
cannot see the wrongness of interfering with the criminal justice process
as a harmful wrong, however indirect the harm. If the value of retributive
justice is important enough for us to punish people on that basis, isn’t the
wrongfulness of interfering with it the kind of wrongfulness that itself
can attract criminal sanction? If this is the case, we should reject ðP1Þ–
ðP3Þ and therefore HP2.
Retributivist supporters of HP3, however, do not need to see the
wrong of interfering with the criminal justice process or just punishment
as a harmful wrong. Therefore, they can agree that the wrongfulness of
letting the murderer go is to be found in disrupting the delivery of re-
tributive justice. ðP4Þ–ðP6Þ ðthe propositions necessitated by the conjunc-
tion of HP3 and the Retributive PrincipleÞ simply require that, in order
to be criminalized, the conduct also be harmful or risk harm. But what
should we then say of cases where people deserve punishment, but where
punishing them is not preventing harm and where ðwe can stipulate45Þwe
know that punishing them is not preventing further harm? Imagine our
murderer is just such a person—he is an aged criminal ðthough still de-
serving of punishmentÞ, no threat to anybody, and his punishment will
not serve as a deterrent. Releasing him, therefore, does not risk harm to
anyone. If we were instrumentalists about punishment, requiring pun-
ishment to have further good effects, then we would not be able to jus-
45. This stipulation is somewhat unrealistic, as the drivers most likely cannot be cer-
tain that their conduct does not, at least, risk harm. First, I will defend the unrealistic stip-
ulation. Since the harm principle is proposed as a fundamental principle of political mo-
rality, about the proper limits of the criminal law, it should be able to cope with such a
stipulation—it is only by thinking through cases in which some conduct is clearly harmless
that we can assess whether harm plays any role in the legitimate criminalization of that
conduct. Even if we never, or rarely, come across a clearly harmless case, we can ask whether
it can, in principle, be criminalized ðRipstein, “Beyond theHarmPrinciple,” 223Þ. Indeed, it
would be especially odd for retributivists to complain about the use of such examples, since
such examples ðwhere we know that punishment won’t prevent harmÞ are central to de-
veloping the distinctiveness and plausibility of retributivist theory. Second, we can, however,
relax the stipulation. As I observed above ðn. 34Þ, a plausible harm principle will not allow
the criminalization of insubstantial risks. Let us imagine, instead, that the drivers have no
good reason to believe that they create ðand do not createÞ any greater risk of harm than I
do when I let my ninety-two-year-old grandfather out of the car at his bridge club. I take it
my conduct will be outside HP3 and thus so will the drivers’. I am grateful to an Ethics edi-
tor for comments here.
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tify punishment in this case, and we ought to release him. But if we are
retributivists, as per the Retributive Principle, then we think the mur-
derer’s punishment justified, even though this does not prevent further
harm. Given that he can justifiably be punished, are we not permitted—
on that basis alone46—to criminalize the prevention of, or the attempted
prevention of, him receiving his just punishment, and punish those who
break such norms? If we believe that the criminalization and punishment
of the drivers is justified, then wemust reject ðP4Þ–ðP6Þ, for we have found
some conduct that ought to be criminalized even when it is harmless.
I want to emphasize here that my example starts from a harm
principle-approved crime ðmurderÞ. Therefore, I am not seeking to show
the harm-focused retributivist a completely independent crime or set
of crimes that she ought to accept. I am, instead, trying to show her a set
of laws which protect and respond to violations of the ðretributive and
harm-focusedÞ criminal justice processes that she already accepts.47 The
retributivist cannot deny that murder should be criminal or that retribu-
tive justice is a value. The processes which self-protecting criminal laws
protect draw their value from retributive justice and retributive justice
does not draw its value from preventing harm. If we can criminalize vio-
lations of retributive justice in and of themselves, then we can criminalize
behavior that doesn’t harm or risk harm to others.
If the above arguments go through, the retributivist who wants to
hang on to the harm principle might declare herself willing to bite the
bullet, and to argue that retributive justice, in and of itself, is not worthy
of the protection of the criminal law, and that attempts to interfere with
or to frustrate it are not, in the absence of harm or the risk of harm,
worthy of criminalization or punishment: the drivers’ conduct must not
be criminalized or punished.
46. Some will object that even when conduct is harmless, the fact that the criminal law
is an inevitably “blunt instrument” means that the harm principle allows for regulation “in
terms of average cases”—for example, speed limits ðSimester and von Hirsh, Crimes, Harms
and Wrongs, 45–46Þ. To apply this thinking to the present case would essentially see the
criminalization of the harmless release of the prisoner as an unfortunate side-effect of the
criminal law’s blunt nature and would be to deny that the criminalization of the drivers’
conduct is in and of itself warranted. For reasons articulated below, I do not think that
retributivists will, or should, accept this.
47. This element of the argument ðwhich is, I believe, what makes it so powerful when
directed at the retributivistÞ suggests a way that the harm-focused retributivist could amend
the harm principle’s scope—by restricting it to initial offenses ðlike murderÞ. Such a po-
sition would nevertheless represent an important downgrading of the harm principle, and
it would explicitly allow the criminalization and punishment of conduct that is beneficial to
some and harmful to none. However, an argument would need to be made for this re-
striction—in essence, we’d need to know why retributive justice is the only impersonal
value that can warrant criminalization. Although he does not cover the cases I am inter-
ested in here, Metz’s “expressive liberalism” would be an interesting avenue to explore here
ð“How to Reconcile,” 698–703Þ. I am grateful to an Ethics editor for comments here.
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I think this would be an odd position for the retributivist to adopt,
and it is worth noting that in presenting and discussing this work and
these cases I have not found anyone prepared to say that releasing the
murderer should not be criminalized. Rather, retributivists tend to look
for someone who is being harmed ðon which, see belowÞ, or amend the
harm principle ðoften in the direction of HP4—on which, again, see be-
lowÞ. What is wrong with saying that violations or frustrations of retrib-
utive justice ought not, in and of themselves, to be criminalized? First, it
seems implausible, as a matter of policy, that we should have to show
potential harmfulness before criminalizing perjury, bribing witnesses,
absconding, or assisting prison breaks. If we think that punishment is
justified by retributive justice, these actions are wrong because they are
an affront to retributive justice and our attempts to secure it, and are
criminalizable on that basis.
Second, it reveals a kind of inconsistency, though not the strict
logical inconsistency that occurs when the retributivist endorses HP1. To
refuse to allow the criminal law to protect the delivery of retributive jus-
tice seems to require an unstable bifurcation in our attitude toward re-
tributive justice. It requires seeing retributive justice, on the one hand, as
the value that our criminal justice system must promote through pun-
ishment, but, on the other, as the kind of value that is not the sort of
thing we should issue threats to protect, or punish people for frustrating
our attempts to promote—the sort of thing the criminal law should see
as none of its business. Since the retributivist has already accepted that
we punish in order to further retributive justice, wouldn’t it be odd to
say that it would be inappropriate to use that system to criminalize and
punish people for their attempts to thwart its promotion? Since, for the
retributivist, all punishment is based on achieving retributive justice, it
would seem strange to deny that we can punish people for frustrating the
promotion of that very value. For these reasons, I think that denying that
self-protecting criminal law is, in and of itself, justified is an implausible
position, both politically and morally, for the retributivist to adopt.
RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND IMPERSONAL VALUE
Retributive justice is plausibly regarded as impersonally valuable, or im-
personally morally important ðthese two formulations apply to telic and
deontic retributivism, respectivelyÞ.48 That is, the value or importance of
securing retributive justice is not grounded in its being good for some
48. Indeed, retributive justice is so identified with the concept of impersonal value
that it is used an example of an impersonal value that many of us accept in order to bolster
the thought that others ðlike distributive equalityÞ might exist. See Larry S. Temkin, “Equal-
ity, Priority and the Levelling Down Objection,” in The Ideal of Equality, ed. Matthew Clayton
and Andrew Williams ðBasingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002Þ, 126–61.
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particular person. Return to our murderer. Plausibly, punishing him is
bad for him. It is also plausible to believe that it is not necessarily good
for anyone in particular that he is punished. Therefore, the value or im-
portance of punishing him is impersonal. The wrong, and the criminal-
izable wrong ðif we are prepared to accept, as all retributivists surely will,
that such conduct is criminalizableÞ of releasing him is to be found in
the offense to the impersonal value or importance of punishing murder-
ers—the value or importance of doing retributive justice. HP2 and HP3
rule out criminalization purely on the basis of impersonal value or im-
portance—they require conduct to be ðpotentiallyÞ bad for someone ði.e.,
harmfulÞ before we countenance criminalization. Accepting that retrib-
utive justice is such a value, and that it warrants the protection of the
criminal law, therefore means rejecting HP2 and HP3. But, beyond that, it
also means accepting that actions which are good for somebody ði.e., the
criminalÞ and bad for nobody—in other words, Pareto improvements—
can nevertheless be criminalized.
If retributive justice is viewed in this way, then what I have shown
here is not only that retributivists should reject the harm principle but
also that they should reject all attempts to understand the criminal law
through the lens of person-affecting or “grievance” morality.49 Unlike
examples which try to show that the harm principle is faulty by showing
other ways we might negatively affect someone without harming them,
this class of cases shows that retributivists ought to accept the criminali-
zation of behavior that benefits someone, and is bad for nobody. There-
fore, if the retributivist chooses the impersonal value or importance of
retributive justice over the harm principle, her rejection of the harm
principle must be more radical than that often recommended—it is not
harm but rather the idea of negatively affecting other people at all that
she must reject as a necessary condition on criminalization.
IS INTERFERENCE WITH RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE HARMLESS?
Perhaps retributive justice is not best thought of as an impersonal value.
Seeing retributive justice as impersonally valuable means seeing thwart-
ing retributive justice as a victimless crime. Some will deny that retribu-
tive justice is impersonally valuable and will argue that I have ignored
some potential beneficiaries of retributive justice and thus victims of
behavior that frustrates or disrupts it. These potential victims include the
49. Of course, the state will have a grievance, since if it is justifiably punishing, it must
have the right to punish, and so its right is violated when criminal justice is interfered with.
But, crucially, the state is not a person, and it does not, for the retributivist, have this right
in order to protect its citizens from harm or other bad effects but rather in order to pursue
retributive justice. Therefore, the state’s grievance is based on the protection of imper-
sonal value, and so is outside the realm of interpersonal grievancemorality. I am grateful to
Zofia Stemplowska for discussion here.
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victim of the original ðharmfulÞ crime, who is denied “justice”; the orig-
inal offender, who does not experience the appropriate response to their
crime; and the wider community who do not get to live in a ðretributivelyÞ
just society. If any of these people is negatively affected such that they are
harmed by releasing a criminal deserving of punishment, then we will
be able to say that releasing themurderer is harmful conduct and thus, at
the least, within the scope of HP3. However, note that this would not
save the combination of HP3 and the Retributive Principle. Rather, it re-
quires rejecting or amending the Retributive Principle. This is because
the Retributive Principle countenances punishment even where doing
so does not prevent harm. Each of the suggested responses above, how-
ever, claims that deserved punishment, conceptually, must prevent harm,
since a wrongdoer not getting their deserved punishment is necessarily
harmful to someone, and so deserved punishment that doesn’t prevent
harm is a conceptual impossibility.
Nevertheless, those who support such alternative understandings
of the value of retributive justice ðand thus suitable amendments to the
Retributive PrincipleÞ should still not combine them with HP2 or HP3.
With regard to the original victim, it is worth remarking that since the
state prosecutes criminal offenses, it is not clear that we think that “jus-
tice” is good for victims, or, at least, we do not pursue retributive justice
on that basis. Therefore, there may be cases where justice is not good for
a victim, even if justice is, in general, good for victims ðand murder may
be a good example of thisÞ. In addition, it is important to note that the
definition of harm will have to travel some distance for “other people
being punished in my name” to be considered the kind of interest or
source of well-being whose denial constitutes “harm.” However, even if
the original victim is ordinarily harmed when justice is not done or is
frustrated, we can point to cases where it is the original victim who col-
ludes with the original offender to get them off, perhaps by accepting a
bribe. It is clear that in such cases the original victim judges that they are
made better off by having the cash and no justice, rather than justice and
no bribery money. But we could insist that they are wrong, and that they
are harmed by not getting justice. Even if they are harming themselves,
however, they are harming themselves, and HP2 and HP3 do not allow us
to criminalize purely self-harming action.
The same point applies to the original offender. Personally, I find it
wildly implausible that we harm someone by not punishing them ðwhen
such punishment is deservedÞ. This seems to duck the real normative dif-
ficulty of punishment—how can we justify harming people in this way?—
by simply reinventing just punishment as a source of personal good. But
let us grant, arguendo, the claim that deserved punishment is good for
the punished, such that they are harmed if such punishment is disrupted.
This is still not enough to save the harm principle for the retributivist, for
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if the convicted offender is a willing participant in plans to undermine
retributive justice, or if they act alone and, for example, escape from jail,
then even if being on the receiving end of retributive justice is good for
us, the offender consents to such harm, or inflicts it on himself. Since HP2
and HP3 disallow the criminalization of merely self-harming behavior,
they would disallow criminalizing offender-led jail breaks when these
are not harmful to others. Once again, if retributivism is to be retained,
the rejection of the harm principle would need be more radical than the
usual attempts to go beyond it. Here, in order to criminalize such behav-
ior, we’d need to criminalize purely self-harming behavior.
Other potential victims are the wider society whose opportunity to
live in a society where justice is done is set back.50 How could somebody
else escaping justice harm me? Here are two possible stories about why
we are harmed when retributive justice is set back. On the first, we want
to punish wrongdoers, and so those wrongdoers who escape justice frus-
trate this aim. In order for interference with the achievement of this
desire to engage the harmprinciple, however, we would have to ðaÞ hold a
desire-fulfillment or achievement view of welfare; and ðbÞ hold that set-
backs in welfare constitute harm in the relevant sense. Endorsing both of
these positions, however, would reduce the harm principle to a mean-
ingless restriction on the scope of the criminal law. All that would be re-
quired in order to make conduct within the ambit of the harm principle
and thus potentially51 criminalizable is that someone must have taken it
as their aim to stop such conduct or to live in a world without such con-
duct. Thus, provided someone wants to live in a world without homosex-
ual sex ðor wants to protect an impersonal valueÞ, then homosexual sex
ðor offense to that impersonal valueÞ will be within the ambit of HP3—we
would have license to make anything harmful, simply by giving ourselves
goals that conflict with such behavior.
Another way that we may be harmed when somebody escapes just
punishment is that in doing so they perform or create an injustice, and
injustice is inherently bad for us and harms us.52 Perhaps injustice is al-
ways bad for us—justice is a valuable goal and it is plausible to believe
that my life goes, in some way, better when I live in a just society. But what
the advocate of this response requires to be true is not only that injustice
is bad for us, but that retributive injustice harms us, and, furthermore,
harms us in the sense invoked in the harm principle. It is this last claim
50. I am grateful to Antony Duff, Catriona McKinnon, Zofia Stemplowska, and Victor
Tadros for comments and discussion here.
51. The wrongfulness criterion must be remembered here.
52. For such a view, see John Broome, Weighing Goods ðOxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991Þ, 168–69. For criticism, see Temkin, “Equality, Priority and the Levelling Down
Objection,” 147–51.
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that I think is particularly problematic for the retributivist who advo-
cates the harm principle. While I have tried thus far to discuss the harm
principle while remaining as neutral as possible on the correct under-
standing of harm,53 it is clear that each time we stretch the concept away
from its intuitive core, we render the harm principle a little less distinctive
as a claim. To say that injustice automatically harms, however, stretches
things such that the harm principle becomes completely worthless—it
saves the combination of retributivism and the harm principle at the cost
of reducing the harm principle’s role in criminalization decisions to
nothing, rendering it nothing more than a platitude.
Let us call the intuitive core of harm, where I am directly affected by
some conduct, like when my leg is cut off, “well-being harm” ðI won’t try
to say here exactly what is and isn’t in this categoryÞ. Now, let us call the
harm inherently caused to me by someone else doing or causing a re-
tributive injustice ðor undermining a just institution or a fair distribu-
tionÞ, whether or not it directly affects anyone, “justice harm.” Were HP2
and HP3 to include justice harms, as well as well-being harms, within their
scope, they would become redundant. The harm principle is supposed
to be a substantive claim about the proper scope of the criminal law and
a tool with which to assess and critique our positive law. But if some con-
duct’s harmfulness can depend on its either being part of the proper
scope of the criminal law, or its being part of the positive criminal law,
then the concept of harm cannot help us determine the proper scope of
the criminal law and/or assess our positive criminal law.
Take, first, the moral retributivist. She believes that certain kinds
of moral wrongdoing ought to be punished. If she advocates the HP2 or
HP3, then she believes that only wrongful conduct which harms ðor risks
harmÞ ought to be punished.However, if retributive injustice harms, then
all conduct that is punishable harms, since all punishable conduct creates
an injustice or an unfair distribution ðfor, at least until the actor is pun-
ished, there is a retributivist injustice or an unfair distributionÞ and ðpro-
vided there is some risk of not being caughtÞ undermines just institu-
tions. If all that ought to be punished harms, then the harm principle is
true by definition: only harmful conduct is punishable, because punish-
able conduct is by definition harmful.
53. Harm is a notoriously slippery concept. See Holtug, “The Harm Principle”; Davis,
“Harm and Retribution”; Bernard E. Harcourt, “The Collapse of the Harm Principle,”
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 90 ð1999Þ: 109–94. For recent work on the concept
of harm, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the
Significance of Harm,” Legal Theory 5 ð1999Þ: 117–48; MatthewHanser, “TheMetaphysics of
Harm,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 ð2008Þ: 421–50; Judith Jarvis Thomson,
“More on the Metaphysics of Harm,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 ð2011Þ:
436–58; Matthew Hanser, “Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm,” Philosophy and Phenom-
enological Research 82 ð2011Þ: 459–69.
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Now take the legal retributivist. She believes that legal wrongdoing
ought to be punished. If she advocates the harm principle, then she also
thinks that we should decriminalize nonharmful or self-harming conduct
and should only criminalize conduct that harms others. However, if retrib-
utive injustice harms, then all legally defined wrongdoing harms, since
all legal wrongdoing creates a retributive injustice. If all legal wrongdo-
ing is harmful, then the harm principle cannot be used to assess or cri-
tique our positive criminal law, for all conduct proscribed by criminal law
will, by definition, already be harmful. And any conduct will be made
harmful by criminalizing it. Only if harm has a nonlegal definition can it
be used to assess, amend, or guide us in enacting our criminal law.
The harm principle was supposed to tell us something about what
conduct is punishable or ought to be within the criminal law. But if pun-
ishable or criminalized conduct is automatically harmful ðas it is when we
include justice harms within the concept of harmÞ, then the harm prin-
ciple cannot tell us anything about what should be criminal or is pun-
ishable—it is no longer a substantive claim.
RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE LEGISLATION HARM PRINCIPLE ðHP4Þ
In order to reject, on behalf of the retributivist, HP2 and HP3, we have, in
part, looked at cases in which harmless ðor, perhaps, self-harmingÞ con-
duct nevertheless ought to be criminalized. However, recall that John
Gardner and Stephen Shute recommend this version of the harm prin-
ciple, which does not require conduct to be harmful or risk harm:
The Legislation Harm Principle ðHP4Þ: it is a necessary condition of
criminalizing conduct that criminalizing the conduct will prevent
harm.
What does our argument here tell us about this version of the harm
principle? Since I have pointed to conduct that could be harmless, but
that the retributivist ought to think criminalizable, a harm principle that
allows the criminalization of harmless conduct is obviously to be pre-
ferred ðif one is a retributivistÞ. So, the present article may, for some, be
an argument for retributivists accepting HP4. And, indeed, retributivism
is logically compatible with HP4. The conjunction can be endorsed if the
retributivist endorses one of the following positions:
ðP7Þ Wemay criminalize conduct only if criminalizing the conduct
will prevent harm. Only criminalized conduct deserves pun-
ishment.
ðP8Þ A necessary condition of criminalizing conduct is that it will
prevent harm. A separate necessary condition is that the con-
duct deserves ðor will deserveÞ punishment.
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However, I think that the retributivist should reject HP4 as well. Consider
our cases of harmlessly assisting people escape justice. Even on the HP4
version of the harm principle, this may be legitimately criminalized only
if doing so will prevent harm. ðIndeed, on HP4, even harmful behavior,
like assault and murder, can only be criminalized if doing so will prevent
harm.Þ From the retributivist perspective, should we criminalize harm-
less interference with the pursuit of retributive justice ðor assault and
murderÞ only if doing so prevents harm? Intuitively, this does not seem
right. Surely the conduct is worthy of criminalization and deserving of
punishment in and of itself.
The retributivist, however, should not accept HP4 principally be-
cause she should not endorse its grounds. What is the justification for
the harm principle as understood by Gardner and Shute? It does not
demand that we punish for harmful or harm-risking behavior, and it does
not try to build an understanding of criminal law founded on harmful
wrongs. Therefore, we can ask, if the harmless wrongdoer is a suitable
target for the criminal law in the absence of harm, why is there a harm-
prevention requirement on criminalizing his conduct? An answer to this
is provided by Gardner and James Edwards. They write: “Wherever ½the
criminal law$ goes, it spreads its own harms, not only the intentionally
inflicted harms of punishment but many harmful side-effects too. The
harm principle requires that it do so only in return for harms avoided. To
defend the harm principle as a strict limit on criminalization is thus to
defend the proposition that harm takes lexical priority over other ill-
effects of wrongdoing, since no amount of harmless pain or inconve-
nience can ever warrant an infliction of even very slight harm.”54 There-
fore, Gardner and Edwards support HP4 because they buy this claim:
ðP9Þ Harm is lexically dominant. Harm may be done only if it
prevents harm.
Should we accept ðP9Þ? Personally, I doubt it. But retributivists certainly
should not. ðP9Þ says we can only harm if it prevents harm. Retributivists
could deny ðimplausibly, I believeÞ that punishment harms. This means
that they could accept ðP9Þ, but since they would not think just pun-
ishment harm, ðP9Þ would not restrict the use of this tool. If, however,
the retributivist believes ðlike Gardner and EdwardsÞ that punishment is
harm, then they have already rejected the key proposition, ðP9Þ. They
believe that pursuing retributive justice can outweigh the importance of
avoiding harm: the harms of punishment can be imposed in order to
54. John Gardner and James Edwards, “Criminal Law,” in The International Encyclopedia
of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette ðOxford: Blackwell, 2013Þ, 1190. See also Husak, Overcrim-
inalization, 203–5.
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achieve retributive justice. Given this, they cannot endorse the claim that
avoiding harm takes lexical priority over everything else.
The retributivist might accept the following:
ðP10Þ Undeserved harms are lexically dominant. Undeserved harm
may be done only if it prevents undeserved harm.
ðP10Þ places a firm wedge between harms that genuinely further re-
tributive justice and those that do not. The undeserved harms caused by
the criminal justice process will take the form of unjust punishment and
side-effect harms ðsuch as the harms done to the friends and relatives of
criminalsÞ. If the retributivist accepts ðP10Þ, then two things follow. First,
the retributivist vastly reduces the role that her retributivism can play
in any actual punitive scheme. The retributivist can allow for just pun-
ishment ðdeserved harmÞ, when no undeserved harm will be brought
about, without preventing undeserved harm. However, since all actual
punitive schemes produce undeserved harms, through side-effects and
errors, in setting up such any actual scheme we must focus first and
foremost on preventing undeserved harms. If punishing our murderer
causes or risks, but does not prevent, undeserved harm, then we must
not do it—no amount of retributive justice makes up for a speck of un-
deserved harm. Therefore, accepting the lexical priority of preventing
undeserved harm means rejecting the Retributive Principle in a world
like ours, where we cannot be sure that only deserved harms will be
done.
Second, accepting the lexical priority of preventing undeserved
harms over other goals means accepting the harm principle not as a fun-
damental principle about what kinds of conduct the criminal law ought,
in principle, to be concerned with but rather as a contingent principle. It
is a principle that we endorse only when and because the criminal law
makes mistakes or harms those it does not intend to—it is the risk of
undeserved ðand thus unintendedÞ harm that drives the restriction. We
can reject HP4 and criminalize conduct even when doing so will not
prevent undeserved harm, if we know that only deserved harms will
result. But since our institutions cannot do this, then we should accept
HP4 in the real world.
Put together, these two points allow us to endorse both the harm
principle and retributivism but not to put them together within a system
of criminal law ðwe cannot endorse them togetherÞ. That is because the
two principles operate at different levels. Retributivism, on this view, is
an ideal principle, which we can use only where retributive justice will be
delivered with perfect precision and will not harm anyone undeservedly.
The harm principle, meanwhile, is not an ideal principle—it is a prin-
ciple only for use in worlds ðlike oursÞ where criminal justice is delivered
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imperfectly, where undeserved harm might be done by the system. In
other words, the harm principle is a principle for the kind of world
where retributive justice will not get a look in.
COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE
Thus far I have shown that those who endorse the Retributive Principle
should not accept any version of the harm principle. Even retributivists,
however, who believe that punishment must be justified with reference
to preventive concerns ðand thus reject the Retributive PrincipleÞ could
fall within the ambit of the thesis defended here, provided they accept
that a principle of comparative proportionality should play a role in sen-
tencing that is not fully subservient to preventive concerns.55 This is im-
portant, since it brings many more theories and theorists within the ambit
of my thesis. Indeed, some have argued that a commitment to propor-
tionality is essential to retributivism,56 and Matt Matravers argues that the
“retributivist” resurgence of the second half of the twentieth century was
really a demand for proportionality in sentencing, rather than a demand
that punishments be deserved.57
Comparative proportionality demands two things—that like cases
be treated alike, and that unlike cases be treated differently in propor-
tion to their differences.58 Theories which give a fulsome role to com-
parative proportionality in punishment fall within the ambit of my thesis
because comparative proportionality can recommend nonbeneficial or
nonharm preventing punishment and therefore, like retributive justice,
can be seen as impersonally valuable or important. To see this, consider
a society which has only two crimes: A-ing and B-ing. B-ing is twice as bad
as A-ing, such that comparative proportionality demands that B-ing be
punished twice as much as A-ing. Imagine that, as things currently stand,
A-ing is punished with two years’ imprisonment, and B-ing with four, in
accordance with comparative proportionality. The legislature learns that
55. This will include those who see retributivism/desert as having a role only in an-
swering the second and third of Hart’s questions ðwhom may we punish? and how much?Þ
and not in answering his first ðwhy may we punish?Þ. See H. L. A Hart, Punishment and Re-
sponsibility ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2008Þ, 8–13.
56. Andrew von Hirsch, “Proportionate Sentencing: A Desert Perspective,” in Princi-
pled Sentencing, 3rd ed., ed. Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth, and Julian Roberts
ðOxford: Hart, 2009Þ, 115–25 at 117; Douglas Husak, “Retributivism, Proportionality, and
the Challenge of the Drug Court Movement,” in Retributivism Has a Past: Has It a Future?, ed.
Michael Tonry ðNew York: Oxford University Press, 2012Þ, 214–33 at 214.
57. Matt Matravers, “Is Twenty-First Century Punishment Post-Desert?,” in Tonry, Re-
tributivism Has a Past: Has It a Future?, 30–45.
58. Comparative proportionality is sometimes referred to as “ordinal proportionality,”
and can be contrasted with limiting proportionality, which simply demands that punish-
ments for a given crime do not exceed some absolute level.
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if it increases the punishment of A-ing by one year, to three years, this
will dramatically decrease incidences of A-ing. This move will, in and of it-
self, be just—the decrease in A-ing will justify the increased sentence on
the preventively oriented punitive theory endorsed by the society. Com-
parative proportionality, meanwhile, demands that the sentence for B -ing
be increased from four to six years, so that the punishment for B -ing
remains twice that of A-ing.59 However, B-ers are more determined than A-
ers and less easily deterred. The legislature learns that incidences of B -ing
will not decrease at all by increasing the sentence from four to six years.
Thus the increase in punishment for B-ing, introduced in the name of
proportionality, serves no preventive function whatsoever—a sentencing
regime of three years for A-ing and four years for B-ing would be just as
effective preventively, but it would be comparatively disproportionate and
thus disallowed.
Given this, once the increases—from two to three and four to six
years, respectively—are enacted, B-ers serving the last two years of their
sentence are being punished purely to serve the goal of proportionality.
Plausibly, they are made worse off, while nobody is made any better off,
and if so comparative proportionality ðif it has valueÞ has impersonal
value.
Since punishing people interferes with them, and this interference
is not being done with the aim of preventing harm, then HP1 is to be
rejected. Since it requires harming people without preventing harm,
then those who endorse it should reject the lexical dominance of harm
prevention and thus reject the grounds of HP4. And, if we can crimi-
nalize people interfering with the last two years of the B-ers’ sentences,
then we can criminalize harmless conduct and thus should reject HP2
and HP3.
Imagine a group who starts to break B -ers out of jail only in the last
two years of their sentence. They develop a harmless technique of jail-
breaking, and publicly explain that they will not break any B -ers out until
they have served four years, so all B -ers will know that they will serve four
years. Since this sentence has the same preventive effect as six years, the
group do no harm to anyone else through weakening the primarily pre-
ventive enterprise of punishment. Therefore, HP2 and HP3 would demand
that their conduct be allowed by criminal law, since it is harmless. And
yet, if we believe in a principle of comparative proportionality, do we be-
lieve that a society cannot legitimately legislate to protect proportionate
punishments? If comparatively proportionality is so important that it ex-
plains why we should punish B -ers for an extra two years in the first place,
59. I ask you to imagine that the overall severity of a punishment is directly propor-
tionate to the length of a sentence, such that you always punish twice as much by punishing
twice as long. This is obviously controversial.
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is it not also worth protecting with criminal law? If so, HP2 and HP3 must
be rejected, and impersonal values, and not only harms or harm-like
concepts, can justify criminalization.60
CONCLUSION
In this article I have argued that two commonly held positions in the
philosophy of criminal law—that punishment is based on desert ðor that
punishments must be comparatively proportionateÞ and the harm prin-
ciple—should not be endorsed alongside one another. I have not tried
to say whether we should reject the harm principle or retributivism, but I
have shown four different versions of the harm principle should not be
endorsed alongside retributivism, and so one of themmust be rejected. I
think retributive justice ðand comparative proportionalityÞ are best seen
as impersonal values—if they are good, they are not good because they
are good for anyone. And if we believe that an impersonal value is at the
very center of the justification of punishment, that we can punish in
order to serve retributive justice or proportionality, then it seems odd to
think that we cannot criminalize and punish in order to protect or re-
spond to violations or disruptions of that very value. And if we can crim-
inalize on the basis of impersonal values, then the criminal law is not only
properly concerned with behavior that negatively affects other people or
beings.
60. Obviously the retributivist may insist that proportionality is good for someone. My
replies to such a claim will be along the lines ðmutatis mutandisÞ of those made in the
section “Is Interference with Retributive Justice Harmless?”
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